Civil War Campaigns of 1864

This monograph analyzes the three major Civil War campaigns of 1864 in regard to several of the precepts of military theory. It uses the Wilderness, Petersburg, and Atlanta Campaigns, which moved the United States of America into the era of modern warfare, as case studies of the applicability of traditional military theory to modern warfare. The monograph first reviews the relationship between politics, strategy, operational planning and tactics, then discusses why these campaigns ended without the classic decisive, climatic battle. Next it offers an explanation of Grant's use of attrition warfare. The monograph concludes that a truly amazing phenomenon occurred during this year of the war. While Grant held Lee to a grinding campaign of attrition, he released Generals Sherman and Sheridan for highly successful campaigns of maneuver warfare in Georgia and the Shenandoah Valley respectively. Sherman and Sheridan provided the only Union tactical and operational successes of 1864, and excitement over their accomplishments gained Lincoln reelection. In the Eastern Theater of Operations, meanwhile, Grant lost almost every operational and tactical contest, but secured for the United States of America strategic victory. The Confederacy, of course, had Robert E. Lee, who was a superb operational artist and tactician. Lee, however, forced onto the defensive behind extensive field fortifications, was fighting with a worn out army, against an enemy (Grant) with vastly superior manpower and resources who was forcing constant combat. Grant was intent on attrition warfare, and during 1864 went about bleeding the Confederate Army dry. The indications are that nations at war must understand military theory and its implications. There is little doubt that such a nation has a distinct advantage.