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This monograph asserts that phasing as a tenet of operational art has outlived its usefulness. Phasing as a component of campaign design worked effectively in the industrial age of symmetrical opponents, but has lost its usefulness in the contemporary and future operational environment characteristic of the information age. The monograph uses three primary lenses; Toffler's Third Wave, systems theory, and complexity to analyze the phasing construct and determine its continued utility. Chapter One introduces the problems associated with modern phasing briefly, specifically citing the reality of the "three block war," and when phases overlap markedly in space and time. It then establishes the research questions and methodology for the rest of the monograph. Chapter Two traces the history of phasing and how it enters into the military operational vernacular. Beginning with Napoleon and Clausewitz and continuing through World War I, interwar World War II, into Vietnam and Air Land Battle, the monograph follows the uses of phasing and how the term has matured. More importantly, chapter two lays out the conditions in which phasing is effective, an industrial age, threat based environment. Chapter Three introduces critical concepts to be used as lenses to analyze phasing in a new light, that of a contemporary operational environment. First, Alvin Toffler's themes of the Second and Third Wave are compared to phasing and the conclusion established that phasing is largely an outgrowth of Industrial age thinking. Second, systems theory is introduced and compared to the linear construct of phasing and conclusion established that phasing lacks a systems approach to problem solution. Finally, complexity theory is introduced and compared to the phasing construct and concludes that the myopic fixation on center of gravity fails to appreciate the new realities of dynamic complex enemies. Chapter Four introduces the case studies of operational design of Operation DESERT SHIELD and D