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Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Angielski
352 b
30 dni na zwrot towaru
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Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for a society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using economic and econometric models, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. Numerical simulations are used to compute efficient insurance schemes under various assumptions.
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Angielski
