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This study examines a portion of the current US Army rear operation doctrine as it applies to the tactical level of war. Specifically, it compares the capability of the dedicated rear area tactical combat force (TCF) with an on-order tactical combat force (TFC) to effectively counter a level III Soviet incursion into the division rear area (DRA). To obtain evidence for this comparison contemporary TCF practices in nine US Army divisions are examined, as well as, the rear experiences of the 24th Infantry Division along the Naktong River during the Korean conflict in August 1950. The author concludes that the tactical combat force (TCF) portion of the rear operations doctrine is vague, that it requires revision. Due primarily to the scope and capability of Soviet combat units to successfully engage our rear area, the criticality and vulnerability of the sustainment effort emanating in the division rear area the need for a dedicated rear area TCF subordinated to the Rear Operations officer possesses the greatest potential for successfully countering a level III Soviet threat, thereby maintaining a continuous sustainment effort to the close-in and deep operations of the unified battlefield.