Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law

One might mistakenly think that the long tradition of economic analysis in antitrust law would mean there is little new to say. Yet the field is surprisingly dynamic and changing. The specially commissioned chapters in this landmark volume offer a rigorous analysis of the field's most current and contentious issues. Focusing on those areas of antitrust economics that are most in flux, leading scholars discuss topics such as: market definition and market power, predatory pricing, refusals to deal and price squeezes after Trinko and Linkline, proving horizontal agreements after Twombly, vertical exclusionary conditions, assessing vertical price-fixing after Leegin, horizontal mergers, mergers that eliminate potential monopsony power competition, the economics of antitrust enforcement policy, measuring damages, the intersection between antitrust and patent issues, regulated industries, and international antitrust issues. Students and scholars of law and economics, law practitioners, and economists with an interest in industrial organization and consulting will find this seminal Handbook an essential and informative resource.